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Abstract 
The article deals with the question of how German members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) represent the German model of religion-state relations at the European level. Based 
on a survey and interviews with German MEPs as well as a content-analysis of German 
MEPs’ speeches, motions and parliamentary questions during the 7th term of the European 
Parliament, the article demonstrates that this model is represented in three dimensions: First, 
German MEPs reflect the close cooperation between the churches and the state in Germany, 
primarily on social issues, through largely church- and religion-friendly attitudes and 
relatively frequent contacts with religious interest-groups. Second, by referring to religious 
freedoms and minorities primarily outside the EU and by placing Islam in considerably more 
critical contexts than Christianity, German MEPs create a cultural demarcation line between 
Islam and Christianity through their parliamentary activities which is similar, though less 
politicised, to cultural boundaries often produced in public debates in Germany. Third, the 
article illustrates similar patterns of religious affiliation and subjective religiosity among 
German parliamentarians in both the European Parliament and the national parliament, which 
to some degree also reflect societal trends in Germany. Yet our data also suggests that 
European political elites are more religious than the average German population. If the 
presence of religion in terms of religious interest- groups and arguments is included, the 




Germany is the largest member-state of the European Union (EU). Germans thus constitute 
the largest national group within the European Parliament (EP). Germany can furthermore be 
considered a unique case in Europe in terms of how religion and the state as well as the 
political sphere are linked with each other. The close cooperation of the state with the 
Protestant and Catholic Churches, particularly on issues of providing social welfare, and the 
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presence of two major Christian faiths, render Germany a case that is worth studying in the 
context of religion and politics in the EU.  
 Drawing on the assumption that national models of church-state relations (in a broader 
sense) affect the perceptions and behaviour of parliamentarians, we examine in this article 
whether and how the German members of the EP (MEPs) represent the German model of 
publicly dealing with religion at the European level. This German model is, on the one hand, 
characterised by a close cooperation between church and state, primarily in the sphere of 
social welfare provisioning, and thus by a privileged and acknowledged role of religion in the 
public sphere. On the other hand, there is a continuous trend of individual and societal 
secularisation observable, and religion increasingly becomes politicised as a factor 
contributing to social conflict. It is primarily Islam which is used to mark cultural boundaries 
between ‘us’ (the – Christian or non-religious – majority society) and ‘them’ (allegedly 
primarily Muslim immigrants).  
 Are these trends reflected by the perceptions, attitudes and activities of German 
MEPs? Drawing on data obtained via the RelEP survey, semi-structured interviews with 
German MEPs (conducted between 2011 and 2012 in Brussels, Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen) 
and a qualitative content-analysis of German MEPs’ speeches, motions and parliamentary 
questions during the 7th parliamentary term (2009-June 2013), we shall illustrate throughout 
the following sections how the German model is indeed mirrored in several respects. The 
German MEPs consider the churches and religious interest groups to be legitimate partners in 
supporting social interests rather than religious interests. The analysis of parliamentary 
activities reveals a primarily religion-friendly attitude on the part of the German MEPs, which 
is facilitated by addressing religion primarily as an issue of human rights, especially freedom 
of religion and the rights of religious minorities, allowing a relative consensus between 
believers and non-believers and different denominations on issues of religion. However, the 
overwhelming majority of these activities refer to religious freedoms and minorities outside 
the EU, and place Islam in considerably more critical contexts than Christianity, disclosing a 
similar cultural demarcation line between ‘us’ (Christian Europeans) and ‘them’ (extremist 
Muslim outsiders) to that which is observable in public debates in Germany. Differences 
between political groups in this regard are important to consider though, with the Group of the 
European People’s Party (EPP) much more affirmative of Christianity and critical of Islam 
than, for instance, the Greens and the Left.  
 The article is divided into three parts. In the first part, we describe the state-church 
regime, its historical development, and the role of the churches in Germany, as well as the 
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state of secularisation and religious pluralisation and the public politicisation of religion in 
order to delineate the German model of church-state relations. In the following part, we 
present our findings on German MEPs in order, first, to find out about how relevant they 
perceive religion to be in the workings of the EP, and, primarily, to demonstrate how their 
activities and attitudes reflect the predefined German model. Subsequently, we ask whether 
their religious affiliation and religiosity mirror societal trends in Germany. In this part, we 
also turn to the national level in Germany and investigate religious affiliation and the 
religiosity of members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) to approach this question.  
 
Religion and politics in Germany 
 
The current church-state regime in Germany is based on a compromise laid down in the 
constitution of the Weimar Republic in 1919. The compromise consisted in rejecting a state 
church regime (favoured by conservative and church-friendly parties), but allowing the 
churches a privileged status under public law, instead of strictly separating them from the state 
according to the French or US pattern (favoured by the parties of the left). The constitution 
furthermore introduced freedom of conscience and religion and the autonomy of religious 
communities (Cavuldak 2013, 308-314). 
 After the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) took over the 
religio-political compromise of the Weimar Republic. The new constitution additionally 
introduced new provisions, in the end leading to a stronger integration of church and religion 
into the democratic state than before, including an explicit reference to God in the preamble1, 
and the introduction of religious education in state schools. State constitutions were likewise 
extended. The closer integration resulted from the experiences with the Nazi regime. Facing a 
politico-moral vacuum and economic deprivation after the war, many Germans in the western 
part of the country sought hope and refuge in the churches (Cavuldak 2013, 315-316). The 
FRG furthermore used the close cooperation with the churches to distance itself from the 
GDR and its publicly prescribed atheism. The government of the GDR actively repressed the 
churches for ideological as well as power political reasons, resulting in a situation for the 
churches characterised by scarce resources, lack of societal recognition and continually 
decreasing membership (Pickel 2013, 78-79; Thériault 2004, chap. 2). Despite this dichotomy 
                                                 
1  'Aware of its responsibility to God and the people, inspirited by the willingness to serve peace in the 
world as an equal member of a united Europe, the German nation, by virtue of its constitutional power, has given 




of state-church relations, reunification did not seriously raise the question of the religio-
political regime again. With the exception of some politicians from the Greens (formed in the 
1993 merger of the West German Green Party and the East German Alliance’90) and the Party 
of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor party of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED), a large political majority did not see the necessity to rearrange the regime and 
therefore opted for nationally adopting the western one (Cavuldak 2013, 318).  
 The current church-state system is characterised by separation but a considerable 
degree of cooperation. It can therefore be defined as a 'regime of partial establishment' 
(Minkenberg 2013, 58) or, citing the German canon lawyer Ulrich Strutz (1925), 'limping 
separation between state and church' (Cavuldak 2013, 314). Officially recognised religious 
communities can operate as ‘corporate bodies under public law’, allowing them to raise taxes 
from their registered members (German constitution, art. 137.6), usually collected via the 
state as part of official income taxes. Further privileges connected with this status concern 
taxation privileges,  permission to provide religious education in state schools and establish 
theological faculties in state universities, the right to provide pastoral care in prisons and 
military academies, and a voice in public bodies, such as public service broadcasting 
authorities or ethics committees (Cavuldak 2013, 314, 325). The two major churches, the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church,2 automatically received this status after 
the constitutional clause was introduced in 1919, whereas other religious communities could 
receive it upon application.3 Islamic communities, though, have been unsuccessful in 
achieving this status so far, failing, among other reasons, because of the missing church-like 
institutional structure and representative bodies (Cavuldak 2013, 324). However, there are 
efforts by the state to improve dialogue with Islam, for example through convening ‘German 
Islam Conferences’ (2006, 2007, 2011 and 2013) (Cavuldak 2013, 324-327; Tezcan 2011; 
official website http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/DE/Startseite/startseite-
node.html). Further regulations of religion fall into the competencies of the 16 states 
(Länder). Cooperation is furthermore regulated by concordats and contracts between the 
German federal state as well as some of its states with the Holy See and with officially 
recognised religious communities, primarily the two major churches.  
                                                 
2  The Protestant Church consists of different units, called Landeskirchen, which together form the 
Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD). 
3  The condition for receiving this status is the guarantee of continuity proven by a statute and a certain 
number of community members. Religious communities not operating under public law receive a civil law status 
as a private registered association (German constitution, art. 137.5). 
5 
 
 An important part of the privileged role of the churches in Germany is their official 
inclusion into the social welfare system. The outcomes of conflicts between church and state, 
as well as between denominations, on the expanding role of the state in welfare provision in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a considerable impact on the formation of 
different types of welfare states in Europe (Manow and van Kersbergen 2009). In Germany, 
the peaceful resolution of this conflict yielded a compromise between religious and secular 
forces as well as Catholic and Protestant camps. Religion, consequently, became an 
institutionalised partner of social welfare provisioning.  
 The two welfare organisations of the churches, the Catholic ‘Caritas’ (founded in 
1897) and the Protestant ‘Diakonie’ (founded in 1833), are the largest umbrella organisations 
of the German social welfare system. They are the largest actors and employers in health 
services and social work, including health care, elderly care, youth welfare, centres for 
migrants, the homeless, the disabled, and rescue services. About 50% of social care is 
delivered through these organisations, publicly financed through a variety of insurance 
schemes but administered by the churches (Davie 2012, 594-595; Göçmen 2013, 11-13; 
Willems 2007, 317-318). Besides national welfare, the churches also run large development 
agencies which are important actors in German development aid. Even though the two 
Christian welfare associations have lost some of their privileges since the 1990s as a result of  
the pluralisation of the German welfare system – changes in its public financing which 
responded to the increasing (religious) diversity of German society – the institutionalised 
position of the churches in social welfare provisioning is still relatively stable (Göcmen 2013, 
12-13). Facing societal secularisation processes, the German churches derive much of their 
legitimacy from this social role. 
 Levels of church membership, church attendance and individual religiosity have been 
decreasing in Germany since the 1970s. Both parts of Germany have been affected by 
individual and societal secularisation processes, though starting from very different levels. In 
eastern Germany, church membership decreased from 90% (1953) to 27% (1989) to about 
26% (2008), one of the lowest levels of church membership in the whole of Europe. In 
western Germany, by contrast, despite slightly decreasing numbers over time, still almost 80% 
of the population is affiliated with one of the two major churches (Pickel 2013: 79-81). Yet 
active membership is in decline in the western part of Germany as well: Only about 25% of 
the western German population regularly attends church services (Pickel 2013, 82). Only 
about 10% go to church at least once a week; in eastern Germany this number is even lower: 
3% (Elff and Rossteutscher 2011, 113-114). The share of Catholics in this group is larger than 
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that of Protestants as the Catholic faith puts a stronger emphasis on ‘practical’ worship (Pickel 
2013, 82; Elff and Rossteutscher 2011, 115). In both parts of the country the numbers are 
shrinking. The situation regarding subjective religiosity looks similar: about 25% of the 
western German population and more than 50% in eastern Germany do not believe in God. In 
East Germany, about 25% define themselves as atheistic (Pickel 2013, 83).  
 Secularisation in Germany, both eastern and western, is subject to a generational 
effect. Younger age cohorts less frequently attend church services, are less frequently church 
members and tend to be less religious than older age cohorts (Pickel 2013, 84). Secularisation 
processes are furthermore observable not only at the individual level but also at the societal 
level. Functional differentiation is highly acknowledged in the German population, in the west 
as much as in the east, and irrespective of confessional affiliation. Only a few citizens want a 
stronger influence of religious authorities, for instance, on elections or political decision-
making (Pickel 2013, 86).  
 At the political level, however, religious-secular and denominational divisions still 
shape electoral behaviour in Germany: in both western and eastern Germany there is a clear 
correlation between support for the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) or the Christian Social 
Union (CSU) and regular church attendance. Catholics tend to vote for the CDU/CSU much 
more frequently than Protestants (Elff and Rossteutscher 2011; Liedhegener 2011). Secular 
people, at the other end, primarily support the Greens (in the west) and the Left (in the east) 
(Pappi and Shikano 2002; Liedhegener 2012).  
 The programmes and attitudes of the major political parties in Germany have however 
converged on the matter of religion. The Christian democratic parties have increasingly 
stressed their autonomy from confessional divisions and church dogmas, and have started to 
address non-Christian voters as well (Bösch 2013, 211, 213; Gerngroß 2010, 88ff; 
Liedhegener 2012, 243). Compared to other Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, 
references to Christian social doctrines and religion are relatively few. It therefore has been 
contested how Christian both parties still are (Gerngroß 2010, 93; Liedhegener 2012). 
Meanwhile the Social Democrats (SPD), the Liberals (FDP) and the Greens, all three initially 
more critical towards religion, have become more religion-friendly, in terms of their members, 
office-holders, programmes and voters alike (Hering 2011; Liedhegener 2012, 252). The only 
exception from the convergence of the parties is the Left party (Die Linke), which still 




 Germany shows an increasing trend towards religious pluralisation (Table 1). Even 
though the proportion of Muslims is still relatively low, resentment against Islam and 
Muslims in Germany is gaining currency (de Nève 2013; Götze, Jaeckel, and Pickel 2013). 
Increasing levels of religious plurality furthermore challenge the prevailing church-state 
system in Germany with its privileging of Christian and Jewish communities. Some have 
therefore argued that either the 'limping separation' should be extended and applied to all 
religions or religion separated more strictly (Cavuldak 2013, 332; Pickel 2013, 98).  
 
Table 1.  Religious communities in Germany 1990-2010 (%). 
 1990 2003 2010 
Protestant 36.9 31.3 29.4 
Catholic 35.4 31.3 29.4 
Muslim 3.7 3.9 4.6 
Other  1.6 1.7 1.8 
No confession 22.4 31.8 32.5 
Source: Götze, Jaeckel, and Pickel 2013, 284. 
 
 Growing levels of religious pluralisation and Islamophobia have contributed to an 
increase in public discourses on religion (Pickel 2013, 67). Since religion is often 
problematised as a cause of conflict in these discourses, this politicisation does not contradict 
the constant loss of importance of religion at individual and societal levels; rather, both 
processes are mutually constitutive (Pickel 2013, 96). Most prevalent have been debates on 
Muslims and Islam in Germany, such as on Muslim headscarves in public institutions, on the 
willingness of young Muslims to integrate, or on violent Salafism. These debates often 
confound issues of religion and migration (Spielhaus 2013) and position a 'discrete cultural 
Christianity' against an 'ostentatious' Islam (Wohlrab-Sahr 2003). However, the role of 
religion in society has also been debated with regard to Christianity and the Christian 
churches, focusing, for example, on crucifixes in public institutions, on religious education in 
state schools, on Pope Benedict XVI speaking in the German Bundestag, on sexual and 
physical abuse of children by members of the clergy and other church employees, on working 
contracts within church and church-related welfare institutions, and on the refusal of 
emergency contraception in confessional hospitals.  
 The churches have actively participated in most of these debates, as well as in debates 
on moral and ethical issues such as stem cell research, prenatal diagnosis and late-term 
abortions, euthanasia, equal rights for same-sex relationships and family policy. They do not 
8 
 
restrict their participation in public discourses to an exclusively sacral sphere, where the 
preservation and practice of religious rituals takes place, but have transformed themselves into 
a particular sort of modern interest group.4 They not only publicly defend their institutional 
interests in keeping their privileged legal status in Germany and promote their value 
orientations, for example on marriage, family, sexual orientation, education or medical ethics, 
they also, according to their abovementioned social role, put forward moral demands, 
speaking up on issues such as social justice, asylum law, climate change, the environment, 
peace, development and human rights (Gerngroß 2010, 92; Sebaldt and Straßner 2004, 122-
127; Willems 2007, 321-322). European integration has been supported by both the Catholic 
and the Protestant Churches in Germany (Minkenberg 2009, 1203-1206).  
 In sum, the model of dealing with religion in Germany, facing continuing trends of 
individual and societal secularisation as well as religious pluralisation and the politicisation of 
religion, is located between close cooperation with the churches, primarily on issues of social 
justice and development, on the one hand, and using religion, primarily Islam, for cultural 
demarcation, on the other. We now turn to the EP to explore whether and how German MEPs 
represent this model through their perceptions and parliamentary activities.  
 
German members of the European Parliament and religion  
 
Studying the German group in the EP 
 
The 99 Germans represent the largest group of MEPs in the EP. In the seventh parliamentary 
term (2009-2014), the largest share of the German MEPs belongs to the European People’s 
Party (EPP), the second-largest group to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
(S&D). Other MEPs identify as Greens (Greens/EFA), Liberals (ALDE) and members of the 
Left (UEL/NGL) (Table 2). 
 We approached the German group in the EP using three different methods. First, 25 
German MEPs filled in the RelEP questionnaire (response rate: 25.25%). The distribution 
among political parties is fairly representative, with a slight bias towards the Greens, and a 
disproportionately low share of Liberals, female MEPs, and MEPs born in the 1960s (Table 
2). There might be a bias towards MEPs with stronger interests in religion (or in keeping 
 
                                                 




Table 2.  Sample of the German case study. 
 EP* sample ratio (%) 
German MEPs in total 99 25 25.3 
By political group 
  
EPP 42 11 26.2 
S&D 23 6 26.1 
ALDE 12 2 16.7 
G/EFA 14 4 28.6 
UEL/NGL 8 2 25 
By sex 
  
Women 37 7 18.9 
By year of birth 
  
born in 1970s-80s 15 5 33.3 
born in 1960s 24 3 12.5 
born in 1940s-50s 60 17 28.3 
* Situation at time of survey and interviews (October and November 2011). 
 
religion out of the European political sphere) within the sample as many rejections of 
interview requests were based on the statement that the MEP asked would not be an expert on 
or interested in the issue and could therefore not provide any information on the subject. We 
therefore complement the data from the survey with qualitative interviews with 20 MEPs out 
of the 25, who filled in the questionnaire and who were willing to be interviewed as well, and, 
finally, a qualitative content-analysis of all German MEPs’ parliamentary activities.  
 The qualitative content-analysis covers all speeches in plenary, motions for 
resolutions, and parliamentary questions of German MEPs during the 7th parliamentary term 
(cut-off date: 7 June 2013). The data were collected from the personal homepages of the 
MEPs on the website of the EP. First, we researched all activities (5324 speeches, 2334 
participations in motions, 2848 participations in questions5) using various keywords relating 
to religion.6 In a second step, we sorted out all contributions which only casually mentioned 
one of the keywords without really focusing on the issue of religion. We then coded the 
                                                 
5  As the research presented here uses the MEP as level of analysis and since most motions and questions 
are issued by a group of MEPs, these numbers do not represent the number of motions and questions but exceed 
it. 
6  We thank Johanna Voß for her assistance in this research. 
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remaining material (91 speeches, 190 motions, 37 questions) using five categories: (1) status 
of religion in the document (primary or secondary); (2) denominations referred to; (3) 
territoriality (EU internal affairs: certain member states; or EU external affairs: accession 
candidates, neighbouring countries, third states); (4) framing of religion (positive: for example 
as something to protect; or negative: for example a factor contributing to conflict); (5) context 
(for example human rights, terrorism).  
 
The impact of religion on the way the EP works 
 
One of the first questions when reasoning about religion in the EP is about the relevance and 
specific impact of religion. According to the majority of our interview partners, religion has 
an effect on the overall functioning of the EP, though a relatively small one. In order to assess 
the overall effect of religion in the EP, we should differentiate between different 
understandings of the religious effect.  
 At the level of personal attitudes, beliefs and values, religion, at least for religious 
MEPs, is a ubiquitous force, constantly affecting parliamentary work, although this might not 
be expressed explicitly. Some MEPs furthermore stressed the Christian cultural tradition 
which arguably affects decision-making, even of non-religious MEPs.  
 Religious issues and arguments, by contrast, do not come up that often; only when 
corresponding themes are on the agenda. This uncommonness of explicitly religious issues in 
the EP is confirmed by our content-analysis: only 1.7% of speeches by German MEPs in the 
plenary, 1.6% of participations in parliamentary questions and 20% of participations in 
motions for resolutions included an explicit reference to religion, and in all these only 21.1% 
focused primarily on religion, the remainder only briefly mentioning religion, primarily 
freedom of religion.  
 The effect of religion in terms of direct influence of religious actors is perceived by the 
German MEPs to be rather marginal.  
 There are three dimensions which might affect how religion impacts the work of the 
EP: nationality, group membership, and denominational differences.  
 First, national differences, according to the surveyed German MEPs, have the largest 
impact on the importance of religion. Slightly more than half of them (13) thought that MEPs 
from some countries, such as Poland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, were more inclined to use 
religious arguments, whereas MEPs from France and Nordic countries were reluctant to do so. 
The German group was often located somewhere in the middle because of its strong diversity 
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in terms of religiosity and religious affiliation. However, other German MEPs did not see 
much influence of nationality, because of diversity in other national groups as well. Some of 
the interviewed MEPs ascribed the impact of the national dimension less to the extent of 
religiosity in member-states than to their traditions of church-state relations. These traditions 
affect how MEPs from different countries deal with the issue of religion, even if they are not 
part of the national majority. The historical and cultural traditions thus might have a larger 
impact than individual religiosity and confessional belonging.  
 Second, political group membership is assessed to be less effective. Most surveyed 
German MEPs think that religion has no effect on group differences or even blurs them, 
because the political groups in the EP are represented by both religious and non-religious 
MEPs. There is only one exception: most surveyed MEPs agreed on the fact that religion is 
most important for the Christian Democrats in the EPP. The EPP in general, even though 
represented not only by Christian Democrats but also by other conservatives, seems to be 
closest to religion. For instance, it organises a range of religious events and meetings through 
its Group on Intercultural Dialogue and Religious Affairs.7 As far as we know, there are no 
corresponding working groups within the other political groups in the EP.  
 Third, denominational differences are considered to be the least effective factor in the  
functioning of the EP. The majority of the consulted German MEPs (16) saw no impact at all. 
Some German MEPs, though, observed a stronger commitment of Catholic and Orthodox 
Christians to their church and its positions than members of other denominations. However, 
most MEPs also emphasised their lack of knowledge about the confessional adherence of 
most of the other MEPs and consequently could not perceive corresponding differences.  
 In the end it might be the intersection of these three dimensions, culminating in 
Catholicism: MEPs from primarily Catholic countries, from the EPP as dominated by 
Catholics, and of the Catholic faith were, in the view of some interviewed MEPs, most prone 
to religious influence on the politics of the EP. However, most MEPs also stressed the 
diversity both within national and political groups in the EP on issues of religion as well as 
others, making exceptions to the rule common and clear-cut distinctions impossible. In the 
end, when substantial policy issues are concerned, political divisions appear to be stronger 
than religious ones.  
 
Religion in the political practice and socialisation of German MEPs 
                                                 
7  The phrase ‘religious affairs’ was dropped in 2012. However, the group still works primarily on issues 




The privileged social role of the churches in Germany can also be recognised in how German 
MEPs interact with religious interest-groups. Although most of them consider contacts with 
religious interest-groups to be secondary in their work, the frequency of their contacts is 
comparatively high. 
 Half of the surveyed German MEPs frequently deal with religion in their 
parliamentary work. More than half of the MEPs (52%) think that religion primarily plays out 
as a personal source of inspiration for decision-making, especially for the German MEPs who 
consider themselves religious. The consulted MEPs who do not define themselves religious 
do not perceive any impact of religion on their work (12%) or see religion only as an external 
phenomenon that sometimes needs to be dealt with (20%). Contact with religion as an 
interest-group, trying to influence the work of MEPs, is only secondary in the MEPs’ 
perception, despite frequent contacts between some of the German MEPs and religious 
interest- groups.  
 Most of the included German MEPs have regular contacts with religious (or secularist) 
interest-groups. Contacts are somewhat more frequent than those of domestic German 
politicians, but considerably more frequent than the average for MEPs from other countries 
(see Foret in this volume) and for domestic parliamentarians from other countries (Table 3). 
The survey of German MEPs suggests a strong positive association between the religiosity of 
the MEP and the frequency of contacts (all MEPs who reported contacts at least once a month 
or once a week were religious). The political factor, in contrast, seems to be less relevant. 
Although the MEPs with contacts at least once a week are all members of the EEP, MEPs 
with contacts at least once a month or several times a year come from all parties, including the 
UEL/NGL. The most frequent contacts are with the  
 
Table 3.  Frequency of contact with religious and ethical interest groups (%). 
 At least once 
a week 










MEPs: How often do 
religious and ethical 
interest groups contact 
you? 
12 24 44 4 16 
MPs from Germany * 6.4 33.9 54.6  5.2 
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(at least once 
a year) 
(not included) 
Average of MPs from 
15 countries (Western 
and Eastern Europe, 
Israel)*  
4.7 15.9 50.8  
(not included) 
28.5 
* Unpublished data from the PartiRep Comparative MP Survey (Pascal Delwit, Jean-Benoit Pilet, Giulia Sandri, 
ULB, Brussels) (only churches and religious organisations) 
 
German Catholic and Protestant Churches. Other contacts include: Caritas; the Commission 
of the [Catholic] Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE); 
Eurodiaconia; the Conference of European Churches (CEC); the World Youth Alliance; B’nai 
B’rith International; the European Jewish Congress; Laïcite; Brot für die Welt, Misereor (relief 
organisations of the German churches); the German Humanist Union. These contacts are of a 
wide variety: information, policy briefs and position papers sent by email or mail; invitations 
to panel discussions, conversations on certain topics, receptions, religious ceremonies; 
meetings with representatives of religious communities; personal contacts via telephone and 
lunch meetings. Religious organisations furthermore provide expertise and contacts to 
interesting interlocutors, and serve as forums for discussions. Most of the interviewed German 
MEPs have more contacts in their electoral districts in Germany than at the European level.  
 The German churches are regarded by many of the German MEPs as 'normal' interest 
groups and vital contributors to interest mediation. The contact is also often perceived as a 
dialogue rather than unilateral lobbying, particularly by religious MEPs. For most of the 
interviewed German MEPs, the commitment of the churches and non-governmental 
organisations with a religious background is particularly visible on substantial policy issues 
(such as poverty; environmental protection; genetic engineering; development cooperation; 
world hunger; agricultural policy; human rights; issues of social justice; the rights of refugees, 
migrants and minorities; fair trade; recently also the financial crisis), rather than on religious 
or institutional interests of the churches. This primarily altruistic, non-commercial role of the 
churches at the European level, resembling their social role in German politics, provides 
them, in the eyes of most of the consulted MEPs, with legitimacy, and explains their relatively 
frequent contacts. It furthermore distinguishes them from other more traditional churches 
from Eastern Europe and from small groups of fundamentalist Christians, which in the view 
of two German MEPs do not possess the German tradition of social responsibility and often 
agitate against European values.  
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 Given the widespread recognition among German MEPs of religious communities, 
primarily the churches, as legitimate partners in pursuing European values, it is not surprising 
that the majority of the German survey respondents across believers and non-believers as well 
as different religious affiliations and political groups accept the EP presidents’ efforts to enter 
into dialogue with religious communities. Only one atheist S&D member rejected even this as 
an illegitimate interference of religion into the political sphere. Two non-religious Greens 
furthermore demanded that secularist and philosophical groups and intellectuals should also 
be invited.  
 Yet the EP does not have a socialising effect on German MEPs regarding their views 
on religion. 92% of the surveyed German MEPs have not experienced any changes in these 
views during their service in the EP.  
 
Policy sectors and thematic debates in which religion is most salient 
 
German MEPs across all parties display a largely affirmative notion of religion, indirectly 
mirroring the cooperative, religion-friendly model in Germany. Religion is primarily framed 
in their parliamentary activities as something to protect, facilitated by placing it mainly in the 
context of protecting human rights. However, by referring to the issue as one to primarily 
focus on abroad, parliamentary activities also contribute to drawing a demarcation line 
between ‘Christian Europe’ and ‘Muslim violators of human rights abroad’.  
 The content analysis reveals that the policy sector in which religion is most salient in 
the parliamentary activities of German MEPs is external relations. Almost 90% of all 
participations in speeches, motions and questions refer to EU external affairs, primarily in 
third countries (68%) but also in countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) (28%) and in accession candidates (4%). Accordingly, most of the German MEPs who 
are most active on religion (in terms of the number of their religion-specific parliamentary 
activities), or who define themselves as religious, are members of the committee on Foreign 
Affairs, including its two subcommittees on Human Rights and Security and Defence. The 
majority of the surveyed German MEPs (72%) thinks that religion is an issue playing a role in 
EU external relations. However, as one MEP rightly pointed out, the competences of the EP in 
the EU’s external relations are limited. Its politics on religion with its strong emphasis on 
human rights, therefore, is primarily of symbolic significance.  
 Human rights is an area which is particularly suitable for reconciling different views 
on religion. The principle can easily be deduced from Christian values of altruism, equity and 
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human dignity, but can also be based on a non-religious humanist perspective. However, in 
the views of some Christian MEPs, it is primarily the joint Christian tradition which unites 
MEPs across political divisions even though not all of them are Christian. Accordingly, not all 
MEPs consider the protection of freedom of religion and of the rights of religious and secular 
minorities to be an issue of religion, but rather as an issue of fundamental rights.  
 In parliamentary speeches, motions and questions, religion is most often referred to in 
Muslim contexts as most of the countries focused upon have Muslim majority populations, 
such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and Kazakhstan, as well as Egypt, Syria and 
Turkey. However, German MEPs also often refer to freedom of religion and religious 
minorities in other countries, such as Tibet, Myanmar, Russia, Vietnam, North Korea and 
Belarus.8 A strong focus lies on the protection of Christian minorities, but minorities from 
other religions are also referred to, including Islam, Buddhism, Baha’i, Hinduism, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Falun Dafa, Ahmadis, as well as, in some cases, the rights of converts and secular 
people. Jews are primarily referred to in EU internal affairs in activities against discrimination 
on grounds of religion, including most prominently Antisemitism and Islamophobia.  
 The concentration on the rights of religious minorities in the parliamentary activities 
of the German MEPs is one reason why religion is referred to in a primarily positive way. One 
major exception is Islam, on which negatively framed references outweigh positive ones (by 
all political groups). It is often placed in the context of intolerance and extremism, as well as 
violence and conflict.9 However, differences between political groups are important to 
mention here. When we calculate positively and negatively connoted references to Islam, we 
find that the German EPP and ALDE members are more critical towards Islam in their 
speeches, motions and questions than are the Greens and the Left; on Christianity, German 
EPP members are not critical at all.  
 Besides EU external affairs, German MEPs’ views on policy sectors and thematic 
debates in which religion is most salient diverge. Fundamental rights are also perceived as 
important, including issues such as women’s and reproductive rights, rights to life, and the 
rights of sexual minorities. A field particularly often stressed by German MEPs was bioethics, 
such as genetic engineering, stem cell research and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. 
Further fields often mentioned in the interviews include development cooperation, 
enlargement, environmental protection, asylum and integration, social policy, culture and 
                                                 
8  We name here only countries that were referred to at least ten times. A complete list can be obtained 
from the authors.  
9  Given the limited scope of this paper, we can focus here only on major trends and do not report about 
alternative views on issues reflected in our content analysis. 
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education, global food protection, family policy. However, as our content analysis of 
parliamentary activities reveals, these are fields that German MEPs almost never frame in 
explicitly religious terms. Our interpretation therefore is that these policy fields are more 
implicitly affected by religious values (without explicit reference to them), as well as by 
interventions by religious interest groups, such as the churches, which, at least in Germany, 
are strongly involved in many of those debates.  
 A 'special case' in the debate about religion in EP politics is the accession of Turkey to 
the EU, which is not only about adding one more country to the EU but also about the identity 
and the borders of Europe (Minkenberg 2012, 150). 68% of the German respondents think 
that religion is an important issue in the debate about Turkey’s accession, but many of them 
perceive this impact only in a subtle way, for instance when opponents of Turkey’s accession 
highlight cultural differences to obscure their reservations against Islam. The fact that the 
major German churches have been sceptical about Turkey’s accession to the EU, primarily on 
grounds of non-respect for religious freedom and of cultural and value-based differences from 
the other EU members (Minkenberg 2012, 160-163), also suggests a more hidden religious 
factor in the EP, although religion is not explicitly referred to in debates. 32% think religion 
does not play a role at all. 
 Religion itself is not regarded by most of the surveyed German MEPs as an issue 
requiring a common approach by the EU. The case of a reference to the Christian heritage in 
the Treaty of Lisbon, by contrast, is clearly an issue that divides the included German MEPs 
into two groups: believers in the EPP and all others. That a reference to the Christian heritage 
or even God was not included in the Treaty, despite extensive mobilising by EPP members 
and religious organisations, suggests that there is no majority in the EP for overtly religious 
positions.10  
 
Religious affiliation and religiosity: German MEPs and MBs in comparison 
 
One important question in the study of religion and political elites is whether political elites 
mirror religious trends within their societies (Oermann 2007: 151). Therefore, we shall now 
assess whether German politics at the European level is more or less secularised than at the 
national level, and whether parliamentarians represent the religious social structure of German 
                                                 
10  This assumption corresponds to the impression of some of the interviewed MEPs. Another anecdotal 
evidence from our interviews for this assumption is the failed attempt of an Italian MEP to establish an 




society at large. To this end, we complemented our original data with a review of CVs on the 
personal websites of all German MEPs and an additional mini survey, asking the German 
MEPs only about their religious affiliation and personal faith, which eventually provided us 
with information on the religious affiliation of 54.5% of all German MEPs, and on subjective 
religiosity of 45.5%.  
According to our data, about 38.9% of German MEPs are Catholic and 38.9% 
Protestant, 1.9% are Muslim, and 20.4% are unaffiliated with any religion. Reflecting parity 
between the two major Christian faiths in Germany, Christian church members are 
significantly overrepresented in the EP compared with the 29.4% of each of the two major 
denominations in Germany. People of no confession are significantly underrepresented 
compared with their share of 32.5% in the German population (Table 1). However, as we 
stated earlier, we assume a bias towards church members and religious MEPs in our sample. 
But even if the numbers do not allow conclusive findings about the distribution of 
denominations among Germans in the EP, they do mirror some trends which we also find 
among members of the German Bundestag (MBs) (Table 4).  
 




No confession 4.3 
Atheist  0.3 
Not specified 35.9 
Source: Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2010. 
 
 Despite individual secularisation processes in German society, numbers of Christians 
in the German Bundestag have remained relatively stable (Oermann 2007). The 
overrepresentation might be caused by the fact that Christian church members in Germany are 
disproportionately often involved in civic and political engagement (Liedhegener 2011; 
Traunmüller 2009, Roßteutscher 2009). After reunification, Protestants were particularly 
overrepresented in the Bundestag as the Protestant Church was the largest church in the GDR 
and provided an important base for the opposition movement there. In many cases, political 
elites were recruited from this group, although their presence in politics has started to dwindle 
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(Oermann 2007, 157-158). Recently the proportion of Protestants has dropped below the 
proportion of Catholics in the Bundestag (Figure 1). The majority of MBs do not specify their  
 
Figure 1. Denominations in the German Bundestag, 1990-2010 (%). 
 
 
Source: Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestags 2010.  
 
religion (Figure 1). We cannot say whether they have just not given any details or whether 
religion plays no role in their lives. This group of MBs has been increasing over the last 20 
years (Figure 2), suggesting a trend towards the privatization of religion. Catholics, in the 
German Bundestag, as well as in our sample of the EP, are primarily represented in the 
CDU/CSU (and the EPP), whereas Protestants are more evenly distributed amongst all 
parties. The members of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag seem also to be more religious, as 
about 6% do not specify their religious preferences, whereas in the other parties the figure 
considerable higher. Most of the MBs without religious preferences can be found, as 
expected, in the Left and the Green parties (Figure 2). 
 





Source: Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2010.  
 
A similar distribution can be found among the German MEPs in the EP. All included MEPs 
from the EPP (as well as ALDE) also define themselves as religious (with two exceptions who 
did not want to provide information on this question). The majority of them attend church 
more than once a year. Other groups, such as the S&D, the Greens and the Left, are more 
mixed with respect to the presence of both religious and non-religious MEPs. Although the 
total numbers included in the survey are small, they do suggest that the EPP among German 
MEPs is the most religious group, and the S&D and the Left are the least religious: the five 
convinced atheists from our (extended) sample (11.1%) are members of these two groups. 
66.7% of German MEPs who responded to our surveys define themselves as religious. 
In the German Bundestag, about 60% of the MBs do so (Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen 
Bundestages 2010). Both numbers correspond relatively well with the number of believers in 
German society, where about two thirds believe in a God (Pickel 2013, 83). As in society at 
large, the proportion of believers in the German Bundestag has decreased: from about 70% in 
1990 to 60% in 2010 (Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2010).  
 
 Our data thus suggest relatively similar patterns of religious affiliation and religiosity 
in the EP and the German Bundestag. This to some degree also represents societal trends in 
Germany. However, German political elites appear to be more Christian and religious than the 
German average population.  
If we compare the presence of religion in terms of religious interest-groups and 
arguments, though, the Bundestag seems to be more religious than the EP. According to 
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Mariano Barbato, the German Bundestag is a 'post-secular location' which admits religious 
communities and respects religious argumentation (Barbato forthcoming 2014). The specific 
arrangement is contested, but there is not a strict separation of religious discourse from the 
presence of a secular institution. However, explicit references to religion are not integrated 
into the day-to-day work of the Bundestag but confined to particular debates. If these debates 
relate to questions of conscience, parliamentary groups lift party discipline and allow the MBs 
to vote freely. In such debates, for example on pre-implantation diagnostics, MBs also 
exchange explicitly religious arguments and argue about different images of God and 
religious beliefs (Barbato forthcoming). Other issues on which party discipline have been 
lifted include topics such as the living will, late-term abortions, genetic engineering, the 
foreign assignment of German armed forces and the fight against terrorism.  
Many MBs, furthermore, traditionally maintain close contacts with the German 
Bishops’ Conference and the EKD. Each parliamentary group has its own representative for 
churches and religious communities; they are often also members of prominent religious 
institutions such as the Synode der Evangelischen Kirche Deutschland and the Zentralkomitee 
der deutschen Katholiken (Deutscher Bundestag 2012). 
 These considerations correspond well with the views of many of the consulted German 
MEPs: 60% of them think that the place of religion in the EP and in European politics differs 
from the position in Germany. Most think that religion is less salient in European than in 
German politics. One piece of evidence, often referred to in the interviews, is the fact that the 
German Bundestag offers many more structures for religious contemplation, spiritual 
exchange and religious networking than the EP. There exists a (multi-religious) prayer room 
within the Bundestag, in which religious communities organise religious services; there is a 
weekly 'prayer breakfast' in parliamentary premises near the building of the Bundestag; and 
the cross-party group 'Christians in Parliament' is regularly represented at the Kirchentag with 
its own stand (Deutscher Bundestag 2012). MEPs, by contrast, have to organise regular 
religious services and 'prayer breakfasts' outside the EP.   
German MEPs, regardless of whether religious or not, explain the lesser presence of 
religious and ethical themes, debates and voices in the EP by the larger religious and cultural 
diversity in the EP and a considerable participation of states with strict separation between 
church and state, making religion too conflictual an issue to integrate in the day-to-day work 
of the EP. The MEPs noticing a stronger role of religion in the EP than in Germany ascribe 
this to European struggles to find a common identity and more explicit expressions of 






As demonstrated in the previous sections of this article, the influence of the German model of 
publicly dealing with religion is, to a certain extent, mirrored in the perceptions, attitudes and 
activities of German MEPs. The churches are largely recognised as important mediators of 
social interests. Religion is affirmatively referred to in speeches, motions and questions, 
primarily as a matter of human rights of religious minorities, facilitating a relative consensus 
across believers and nonbelievers as well as different denominations, because all MEPs, 
irrespective of individual religiosity or religious affiliation, can agree on this fundamental 
European value. The explicit referencing of religion, due to its focus on Christian minorities 
in Muslim countries outside the EU, as well as negative connotations of Islam, however, also 
contribute to symbolically drawing boundaries between a Christian or secular Europe and 
Islam as an ‘external other’.  
The EP certainly is less ‘post-secular’ than the German Bundestag. Explicitly religious 
arguments and issues are largely absent from the EP. Due to the EP’s great diversity, religion 
appears to be too conflictual an issue to be brought up explicitly and frequently. Leaving 
religion as a subject and explicit pattern of argumentation out of the EP is the smallest 
common denominator allowing efficient day-to-day work. However, as our article has 
demonstrated this does not necessarily mean that the level of religiosity in the EP is 
particularly low, that religious values do not affect individual decisions, and that religious 
interest groups are not received well. Hence religion does affect the workings of the EP but 
still in a more subtle way. The question of whether and how this might be changing and with 
what consequences will have to be answered by future research.  
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